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THE LEGAL STATUS OF JOINT VENTURES UNDER THE
ANTITRUST LAWS: A SUMMARY ASSESSMENT
by
JOSEPH F. BRODLEY*
The spotlight of enforcement interest has begun to focus
more intensely on one of the darkest corners of antitrust law
-joint ventures. The enforcement agencies have in recent
years instituted a number of actions against joint ventures,'
and the House Judiciary Committee this year opened an in-
vestigation of joint ventures in the petroleum industry.2
Precisely because the legal precedents are few and large
areas of uncertainty remain, it seems desirable to set down
as clearly and succinctly as possible what it is that can and
cannot be said about the law of joint ventures. 3 Since my
* Professor of Law, Indiana University (Bloomington).
AUTHOR'S NOTE: This article is adapted from the author's testi-
mony before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, February 11, 1976. The
research assistance of James Gillespie, Denny Thomas and Eric
Brown is gratefully acknowledged. I have also benefited from com-
ments of Stephen Trattner, Esq. of the District of Columbia Bar.
1 United States v. N. Y. Times Co., Civil Action No. 71C615
(E.D.N.Y., filed May 21, 1971); United States v. Hercules Inc., Civil
Action No. 4667 (D. Del.., filed May 31, 1973); Phillips Petroleum
Co., 3 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. at 25,736 (F.T.C. Consent Order,
August 2, 1966) ; Rexall Drug and Chemical Co., 3 CCH Trade Reg.
Rep. at 25,742 (F.T.C. Consent Order, October 11, 1967) ; Brunswick
Corp., 3 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. ff20,887 (F.T.C. Complaint).
2 Hearings on the General Legal and Economic Implications of
Joint Ventures Before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Com-
mercial Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (February 11, 1976 and subsequent dates).
3 The following secondary sources have been particularly useful:
R. Pitofsky, Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: Some Re-
flections on the Significance of Penn-Olin, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1007
(1969); C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 136-141 (1959);
W. Mead, The Competitive Significance of Joint Ventures, 12 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 819 (1967); J. Pfeffer & P. Nowak, Patterns of Joint
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objective is to discover predictive standards for ascertaining
the lawfulness of joint ventures, I place particular emphasis
on what courts have done as distinct from their sometimes
obscure explanatory language. We may be surprised to find
that there is more settled law than at first suspected.
The very definition of a joint venture is unclear. More
than a simple contract yet less than a merger, it remains a
hybrid legal form. Perhaps the key element is continuity,
and the most useful definition is that of Taubman, who de-
fines a joint venture as an "association of two or more per-
sons to carry on as co-owners an enterprise for one or a
series of transactions." 4 While the typical joint venture is
a jointly owned subsidiary corporation, it is not essential
under this definition that either the parents or the joint ven-
ture be corporations.
The decided cases have arisen either under the Sherman
Act or the antimerger provisions of the Clayton Act; in
addition the Federal Trade Commission has alleged, in a
recent complaint, violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.5
Brief reference will also be made to certain issues not appear-
ing in the legal decisions, which may in the future assume
greater importance. I turn first to the status of joint ven-
tures under the Sherman Act, where the bulk of the cases
have arisen.
JOINT VENTURES UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
The courts have found a variety of joint ventures to be
unlawful restraints of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman
Venture Activity: Implications for Antitrust Policy (forthcoming);
J. Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts-
From Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REV. 285, 329-
337 (1967).
4 TAUBMAN, THE JOINT VENTURE AND TAX CLASSIFICATION 83
(1957).
5 Continental Oil Co., 3 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. at 25,743 (F.T.C.
Consent Order, November 21, 1967).
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Act. Where a joint venture tainted under Section 1 has in-
volved all or most of the firms in an industry, it has generally
been found to violate the monopolization provisions of Sec-
tion 2 of the Act, as well.
The anticompetitive abuses which have arisen in the Sher-
man Act cases have been of two basic types: (1) cartel be-
havior, and (2) boycotts and exclusion of competitors. In
the cartel cases the joint venture has been used as a means
of restraining competition between the participants, typically
by fixing prices and dividing markets, thus depriving the
public of the benefits of competition.
In the boycott cases the joint venture has excluded firms
from participating in the joint venture, thereby depriving
them of a vital resource and crippling their ability to compete
with joint venture participants. The evil has been to diminish
the overall vigor of competition as well as reduce equality
of economic opportunity by injuring and handicapping a por-
tion of the competing units.
Predictive factors useful in explaining the decisions of
the courts involving cartel behavior under the Sherman Act
appear to be the following, stated roughly in order of import-
ance:
1. Whether the joint venture stands in a horizontal, verti-
cal or conglomerate relationship to the parents' mar-
ket, i.e. whether (a) the joint venture competes in the
same market as one or both parents, or (b) is a seller
to or buyer from the parents, or (c) there is no obvious
relation between the joint venture and the market of
either parent.
2. The presence of a per se restraint of trade in connec-
tion with the marketing activities of the joint venture.
3. The holding of high market share by the parents or
by the joint venture.
4. The purpose of the joint venture.
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It will be useful to divide the discussion under the sepa-
rate categories, horizontal, vertical and conglomerate joint
ventures. This also accords with the recognized seriousness
of the competitive risk and the frequency of the cases. I turn
first to horizontal joint ventures, by far the most prevalent
situation in the case law.
Horizontal Joint Ventures
The horizontal joint venture raises essentially a problem
of cartel abuse. Where the joint venture competes in the
same field with the parent, the interests of both are apt to
be served by suppressing competition between them. Typi-
cally, this has involved price fixing or division of the market.
While such behavior could occur on either the buying or sell-
ing side of the parents' operations, the cases have focused
their attack on joint ventures that involved restraints on the
sale and distribution of the parents' output. A joint venture
may be horizontal as to one parent and vertical or conglomer-
ate as to the other, and this may necessitate analysis under
the other categories as well, but here we focus on the hori-
zontal.
Horizontal joint ventures themselves fall into two basic
types: (1) the parents may create a joint venture to assume
control of some present portion of their existing competitive
operations, or (2) the parents may create a joint venture to
enter a new geographic market.
JOINT VENTURES BETWEEN EXISTING
COMPETITORS IN EXISTING MARKETS
The transfer by direct competitors of some portion of
their existing operations to a joint venture is obviously sus-
pect, for they have placed under unitary control, activities
which were previously separate and competitive. In this situ-
ation certain rather definite generalizations can be drawn
from the case law.
First: Sherman Act illegality has always rested on a
per se violation invovling the marketing of the product. What-
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ever the character of the joint venture the Sherman Act cases
have rested on a per se violation of the Act involving the
marketing of the product. Where the joint venture is hori-
zontal, the per se violation has been price fixing or division
of the market between competitors. Such per se violation
may be inherent in the very existence of the joint venture or
collateral to its operations. The violation was inherent in
Citizens Publishing Co. v. United States6 where two news-
papers serving the same market, the one profitable, the other
losing money, sought to operate a joint venture to achieve
economies of production and distribution while keeping news
and editorial operations separate. The Supreme Court found
the illegality under the Sherman Act "plain and beyond
peradventure" since profits would be pooled and prices fixed
by the joint venture.7
The antitrust violation in Citizens Publishing Co. also had
a collateral aspect in the agreement by the parents not to
create any other competing entity in the joint venture market.
A17hether the violation is inherent or collateral, however, does
not affect the illegality, though it may have bearing on the
remedy to be given. It is the presence of a per se violation
connected with the joint venture that is crucial to illegality.
Second: Where the per se violation has involved a joint
venture between competitors holding a large market share,
not only has antitrust illegality almost inevitably been found
but the typical relief has included dissolution of the joint
venture. The views of courts concerning the inherent anti-
trust danger of a horizontal joint venture have clearly been
related to the share of the market held by the parents. Thus
in each of the four previously cited cases, Citizens Publishing
Co., Lee Line Steamer, ICI and Paramount, where the par-
6 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
7 See also Lee Line Steamer v. Memphis H & R Packet Co., 277
F. 5 (6th Cir. 1922) ; United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries,
100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); United States v. Paramount Pic-
tures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
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ents together held all or most of the market, the courts would
tolerate no relief short of dissolution of the offending joint
ventures; for where firms dominating a market have utilized
a joint venture to commit a per se violation of the antitrust
laws in the words of the ICI court, any continuance of joint
ownership "provides an ever present opportunity for further
wrong doing." 8
Third: Where the joint venture is between smaller com-
petitors not collectively holding a dominant market share,
the presence of per se violations will lead to injunction of the
unlawful practices but not dissolution of the joint venture
if there is a legitimate purpose for its existence.
Where the parents do not hold a commanding share of
the market, the courts seem clearly to feel that the antitrust
risk in continued existence of the joint venture is more toler-
able. While this leads to no toleration of per se violations,
it does lead to willingness to grant relief short of joint ven-
ture dissolution.
Two recent Supreme Court cases, United States v. Sealy,
Inc.9 and United States v. Topco Associates,10 both involved
joint ventures by smaller firms facing significant competition.
Rejecting the argument that price fixing and division of the
market were necessary to achieve desirable goals, including
effective competition with larger firms in Topco, the Court
condemned the per se violations involved in the marketing
of the products. However, in neither case did the Court re-
quire the dissolution of the joint venture, there being other
legitimate purposes for its existence. The importance of the
last condition as a decisional factor, i.e. the finding of legiti-
mate business purpose, should not be exaggerated, for it
would be a rare management that could not point to some
efficiency-promoting or other legitimate purpose in a com-
8 105 F. Supp. 215, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1952 (remedial proceeding)).
9 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
10 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
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plex business arrangement such as a joint venture. Thus,
the key factor in these cases is the relatively small market
share held by the parents.
JOINT VENTURES INTO NEW GEOGRAPHIC MARKETS
Where firms producing the same product form a joint
venture to enter a new geographic market, the impact on
competition is less immediate and direct. Indeed, since prior
to the joint venture the parents had no presence at all in the
new market, the immediate effect would appear procompeti-
tive. However, taking a somewhat longer range view as dis-
cussed below, the courts have held that where the joint ven-
ture involves major sellers in concentrated world markets,
creation of the joint venture may foreclose a more competi-
tive alternative, individual entry by the parents. Under these
circumstances, the joint venture serves as a means of dividing
the market between the parents. The following generaliza-
tions seem appropriate under the case law.
First: Where both parents are major producers collec-
tively holding a dominant market position, their entry into a
new geographic market by a joint venture which encompasses
the marketing of that product has been held to be an unlaw-
ful division of the market between competitors; and the most
frequent relief has been the dissolution of the joint venture.
Where a joint venture forecloses independent entry by the
parents, into a new geographic market, the injury to com-
petition is best described as an injury to potential competi-
tion. As an issue in recent decisions under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, potential competition has raised difficult prob-
lems of proving what would have happened on hypothetical
facts, and this has clouded the interpretation of the law and
impeded effective enforcement." In the Sherman Act cases
involving joint ventures between major producers holding
1 See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602
(1974); United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Corp., 378 U.S. 158
(1964); United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526
(1973).
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dominant market positions, however, the courts have avoided
these problems by simply assuming that in the absence of
the joint venture the probability of independent entry by
one or both parents was high. The courts reached this con-
clusion not on the basis of complex analysis, but from the
simple logic of the parents' business posture and their eco-
nomic interest, which formulation of the joint venture evi-
denced, in entering the new geographic market. Indeed, in-
jury to potential competition under these circumstances was
virtually equated to an injury to actual competition. This
was perhaps most vividly expressed by the General Dyestuff
court, which in dismissing the argument that the parents,
both among the largest manufacturers of the product, had
not previously been in competition, said, "Neither the letter
of the law nor its purpose 'distinguishes between strangling
a commerce which has been born and preventing the birth
of a commerce which does not exist.'" 12
The essence of the offense then is that two or more firms
on the verge of market entry withdraw in favor of a joint
venture and thereby divide the market between them. s3 In
National Lead and Minnesota Mining the courts required the
dissolution of the joint venture, while in Timken a divided
Supreme Court deemed an injunction prohibiting agreement
by parent or progeny to limit territory, to be sufficient. 14
Involving as it does a per se offense, a joint venture used
as an instrumentality to divide the market between competi-
12 United States v. General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642, 648
(S.D.N.Y. 1944), quoting United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Co., 247 U.S. 32, 53 (1918).
Is See United States v. National Lead, 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y.
1945), modified & aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947) ; United States v. Min-
nesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950); Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
14 The Court noted, however, that one of the parents had recently
become empowered to exercise an option to buy out the other parent,
which atypically was a natural person, recently deceased, so that
there was some probability that the joint venture might eventually
dissolve of its own weight. 341 U.S. at 601, n.10.
460
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tors cannot be saved by the existence of a claimed "legiti-
mate purpose" motivating its creation. The Supreme Court
makes this unmistakably clear in Timken, in rejecting the
defendants' argument that the restraints were lawful as an-
cillary to a "legitimate main transaction," i.e. the joint ven-
ture:
We cannot accept the "joint venture" contention.
That the trade restraints were merely incidental to an
otherwise legitimate "joint venture" is, to say the least,
doubtful. The District Court found that the dominant
purpose of the restrictive agreements into which appel-
lant, British Timken and French Timken entered was to
avoid all competition either among themselves or with
others. Regardless of this, however, appellant's argu-
ment must be rejected. Our prior decisions plainly estab-
lish that agreements providing for an aggregation of
trade restraints such as those existing in this case are
illegal under the Act. (Emphasis supplied.) 15
Second: Where only one parent is a producer in the same
product line as the joint venture, and where the parties have
large market shares, precedent exists for holding unlawful
an agreement or other restraint on the territorial operations
of the joint venture.
Where only one of the parents produces the product, there
is much less basis for assuming that in the absence of the
joint venture both parents would have entered the new geo-
graphic market. More likely there would have been at most
a single market entry, and hence a case of injury to potential
competition is difficult to make out. The competitive risk
lies not in the existence of the joint venture, but in limitations
that may be placed on its development. The risks are also
less severe when only one of the parents is in the joint ven-
ture's product market because the outside-the-market parent
has financial incentive to push for full exploitation of the
joint venture's profit potential even at the expense of the
15 341 U.S. at 597-98.
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profits of the inside-the-market parent. Thus, the anticom-
petitive risk is apt to depend explicitly on the presence of
particular restrictions on the activities of the joint venture.
The Panagra case' 6 illustrates just such a situation. The
joint venture in that case, a South American airline called
Panagra, was potentially competitive in its product line with
only one of the parents, Pan American Airways. The re-
striction on the joint venture was in the form of a veto power
by Pan American based on its 50% stock ownership in the
joint venture, which it had exercised to preclude the Panagra
joint venture from flying routes competitive with Pan Ameri-
can. In the context of the dominant position that Panagra
and Pan American held in air transportation in their respec-
tive west and east coast markets in South America, the court
condemned Pan American's conduct as violating Section 2
of the Sherman Act and ordered divestment of its interest
in the joint venture. The court expressly declined, however,
to find the original creation of the joint venture and terri-
torial allocation between the two airlines 20 years earlier
when both were small new enterprises, to be unlawful; for at
that time the joint venture and territorial restrictions, were
a necessary, even desirable, vehicle for pioneering a new
market.
Thus, the teaching in Panagra goes no farther than to
suggest that when both parent and joint venture become
dominant firms in their separate geographic markets, any
territorial (or other significant) restrictions on their competi-
tive interaction is apt to be held unlawful. The limited reach
of the Sherman Act precedents is further illustrated by the
lower court opinion in Cellophane."7 The district court in
Cellophane specifically upheld territorial restrictions confin-
ing the geographic markets of the joint venture to preclude
16 United States v. Pan American World Airways, 193 F. Supp.
18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
17 United States v. E. I. duPont, 118 F. Supp. 41, 218-222 (D.
Del. 1953), aff'd 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
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competition between the parent foreign producer of cello-
phane and the joint venture established in the then unex-
ploited United States market. While the vitality of the dis-
trict court decision is at least questionable, the Supreme
Court having refrained in its affirming opinion from even
mentioning the lower court's views on the joint venture
agreement, 18 the decision clearly provides no precedent for
Sherman Act illegality.
Thus, based on very limited authority, the law appears
unclear as to the validity under the Sherman Act of terri-
torial divisions of the market between a single parent pro-
ducing the product elsewhere even if it is the dominant pro-
ducer, and a newly established joint venture in a new geo-
graphic market. But Panagra indicates that when and if the
joint venture achieves market power, any such arrangements
are subject to critical reassessment.
OTHER HORIZONTAL JOINT VENTURES
The class of horizontal joint ventures clearly and pre-
dictably unlawful under the Sherman Act is thus relatively
narrow. What is the status of other horizontal joint ven-
tures? More particularly what is the status of horizontal
joint ventures within existing markets which (1) do not in-
volve explicit price fixing or division of the market between
competitors, or (2) involve price fixing or market division
on the supply side of the parents' operations rather than on
the marketing side? (We temporarily put to one side prob-
lems of boycott or exclusion of firms from the joint venture,
to be discussed in the next section.)
The accepted learning is that the broad class of other
joint ventures, like business transactions in general, are sub-
18 See 351 U.S. at 383. The issue may have been considered moot.
The Supreme Court noted that duPont itself raised legal questions
as to at least a portion of the territorial restrictions and notified
foreign licensees as early as 1940 that license agreements were not to
be read as imposing territorial restrictions. Moreover, the district
court's own decision had also rested on an independent ground-
assignment of trade secret rights. 118 F. Supp. at 218-222.
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ject to the rule of reason. The fact is, I have not found re-
ported decisions of joint venture illegality unless a per se
violation appears (though courts may sometimes describe
their inquiry as under the rule of reason). 19 The lack of
significant joint venture enforcement activity based on the
rule of reason does not surprise me, for it accords with a
long standing bias on my part. The limits of effective anti-
trust enforcement are by and large coterminous with the
limits of its per se rules. The rule of reason, calling as it
does for a consideration of all facts-or to exaggerate only
slightly, all evidence that either party thinks relevant-is to
be blunt an ineffective tool for antitrust enforcement. It
can provide no viable basis for effective enforcement policy
because it lacks predictive power where as in antitrust cases
the facts are (1) highly complex, (2) necessarily differing
in significant respects from case to case, (3) subject to liti-
gation by parties possessing large resources and incentives,
and (4) submitted for trial to nonexpert, heavily engaged
trial courts. Thus, I would conclude that as to joint ventures
not involving explicit price fixing or division of the market
between competitors, there is no present doctrinal basis for
significant Sherman Act enforcement.
This still leaves for consideration joint ventures involv-
ing price fixing or market division on the supply side of
the parents' operations. It might be argued that a joint ven-
ture between competitors in the acquisition of an input (i.e.
raw material, productive resource) is as much a fixing of
prices, and where the supply is allocated, division of the
market between competitors, as a joint venture on the out-
put side, involving selling and distribution. In rejoinder it
could be asserted that the economic effects differ significantly.
A joint venture fixing prices or dividing the market for the
output of competitors will generally raise prices, while a joint
venture restraining competition for inputs, e.g. natural re-
19 See United States v. Pan American Airlines (Panagra), 193
F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 371 U.S. 296
(1963).
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sources, may be thought to have the effect of lowering prices.
The difficulty with this rejoinder is that the Supreme Court
has declared with no uncertain force that a combination de-
signed to stabilize or even to lower price is no more to be
tolerated than one designed to elevate price, for both inter-
fere with the operation of a free competitive market ; more-
over, there is specific authority holding joint buying groups
to be per se violations of the Sherman Act.21
There is some authority, nevertheless, for treating joint
ventures differently, where they involve smaller firms seek-
ing methods of competing more effectively with market
leaders. In United States v. Topco Associates Inc.22 the Su-
preme Court, in striking down a per se restriction on the
marketing side of defendants' operations, in effect sanctioned
continuance of the joint purchasing agency of the defendant
independent grocers. Clearly such joint purchasing increased
the buying power of the defendants, operated to reduce pur-
chase prices and therefore could have been described as a
price fixing agreement. It was permitted because it did no
more than allow smaller competitors to match the ability
already possessed by the larger chains to engage in mass
purchasing.
Where the parents of the joint venture have large market
shares, the status of joint ventures on inputs is more ques-
tionable. Of significance may be the decision of the court
of appeals in the Penn Water case.23 There two Pennsylvania
electric utilities formed a joint subsidiary, prophetically
called Safe Harbor, to generate and sell to them electric
20 See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Kiefer
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
21 National Macaroni Manufacturers Assn. v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421
(9th Cir. 1965); see generally, Davidow, Antitrust, Foreign Policy,
and International Buying Cooperation, 84 YALE L. J. 268, 270-274
(1974).
22 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
23 Consolidated Gas v. Pennsylvania W. & P. Co., 194 F.2d 89(4th Cir. 1952).
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power. By explicit agreement Safe Harbor's sales of electric
power were from the outset to be confined to the two par-
ents. Holding that the parents had in other connections en-
tered into unlawful agreements, the court declared the agree-
ment restricting Safe Harbor's freedom to supply power to
outsiders to be "an integral part of an illegal plan." Had
the court said no more, the decision would be unremarkable,
but the court then added:
In addition, as the District Judge found, the re-
straints contained in the Safe Harbor contract itself are
sufficient to invalidate it. It must be borne in mind that
Safe Harbor is so located as to furnish power to cus-
tomers in Pennsylvania and elsewhere, and that in fact
its product is delivered over the lines of Pennsylvania
Water [one of the parents] to various utilities in Penn-
sylvania, Maryland and the District of Columbia; and
were it not for the three party contract, Safe Harbor
would be a potential competitor in this field. (Emphasis
in original.)24
Although the Penn Water court does not suggest that the
joint enterprise was inherently unlawful, the decision clearly
indicates the restrictions on the future independence of a
joint venture involving a productive or other input resource,
where the parents have large market shares, would at the
least be subject to rigid scrutiny.2 5
Vertical Joint Ventures
A vertical joint venture involves the entry of two or more
companies by means of a joint enterprise into a new field,
but one which is vertically connected with the present opera-
tions of the parents in that it is either a seller to or buyer
24 Id. at 93.
25 The sharp distinction that Topco and Penn Water indicate
in the treatment of input joint ventures, depending on the market
share of the parents is symmetrical with the general antitrust law on
buying groups. See Davidow, supra note 21.
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from them. The line between the vertical and horizontal
classification can easily become blurred since a joint venture
involving one process in the production cycle of the parents
has a vertical relation to the other processes. Thus, in a
joint venture between integrated firms, involving some stage
of their operations, there may be both vertical and horizontal
effects. In this paper I have treated such joint ventures as
horizontal, as the horizontal effects seem of predominant
significance. However, analysis of vertical implications may
also be appropriate where there are significant nonintegrated
firms competing at one or more stages (see discussion of
Paramount, infra). Where, on the other hand, a joint ven-
ture involves the entry of the parents into a new stage of
production, the joint venture is purely vertical and the analy-
sis should proceed entirely along vertical lines.
The competitive problem in a vertical joint venture has
at least four dimensions. First, having entered the new field
by joint enterprise, it is highly unlikely the parents would
also enter individually. If the alternative to the joint ven-
ture is two new market entrants, then the single entry by
the joint venture has foreclosed a more competitive alterna-
tive. Second, if the joint venture provides a vital input to
the parents, not otherwise available, competitors of the par-
ent to whom this input is denied will be injured-this raises
the problem of the so-called "bottleneck joint venture."
Third, competitive injury at the joint venture level could
occur when the joint venture is a supplier to the parents
through vertical foreclosure of the joint venture's competi-
tors (but this would also occur if each parent individually
entered the supply market).2 Fourth, if the joint venture
2 This might not seem correct on first examination because un-
like simple vertical integration where both affiliates are under com-
mon ownership, in vertical integration by joint venture the parent
has less interest in the joint venture's profits than in its own; on the
other hand the parent receives a share of the joint venture's profits
from sales to the other parent. The two effects probably roughly
cancel, resulting in a profit calculus similar to that under simple
vertical integration.
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is on the input or "upstream" side of the parents' operations
and if a large part of the joint venture's output is sold to
the parents, the risk of collusion between the parents may be
increased. This is because efficient production planning at
the joint venture level depends upon knowledge of the future
production plans of the parents, and there is no feasible
way for the joint venture to know this without each of the
parents also knowing it.27
On the other hand, a vertical joint venture can be a vehicle
for promoting competition. Individual entry by the parents
may not be feasible, and the alternative to the joint venture
may thus be no new entry at all. This may be a particularly
grievous loss where the joint venture market is highly con-
centrated and the parents' market relatively less so (thus
limiting the risk of collusion between parents). If in the
absence of the joint venture no firm would undertake the
task, an important function will go unperformed.
Vertical joint ventures are of two basic types, (1) bottle-
neck joint ventures, and (2) other vertical joint ventures.
BOTTLENECK JOINT VENTURES
The bottleneck joint venture arises essentially from the
circumstance that a particular stage of operations in an
industry may constitute a natural monopoly. That is to say,
costs per unit at the monopoly stage are declining over the
whole range of output, so that it is highly inefficient, if not
impossible, for more than one firm to exist. In such case the
courts have permitted firms at the competitive stages of the
industry to enter the natural monopoly stage through joint
Whether or not the foreclosure effect of vertical integration is a
real effect is a different question; it suffices for this analysis that
it is legally recognized. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294 (1962).
27 I am indebted for this point to James Gillespie. Collusive risks
are further increased if transfer prices between joint venture and
parents are not at market price, for then output and consumption
controls will be necessary to maintain equality of benefits. See M.
ADELMAN, THE WORLD PETROLEUM MARKET at 82-89 (1972).
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venture, but have required that all firms be given fair and
nondiscriminatory access to the joint venture output. 8
Terminal Railroad is the classic case since the single ter-
minal facility owned by the several defendant railroads was
literally a bottleneck facility through which all railroads
seeking to enter the St. Louis area had to pass. The Supreme
,Court did not condemn the joint ownership and operation of
the terminal, much less the economies it made possible, but
required that all railroads be given access to the single fa-
cility on nondiscriminatory terms. To the same effect is
Associated Press, a joint venture between newspapers, where
again the court did not condemn the joint venture, but struck
down discriminatory by-laws which made it more difficult
for competitors of member newspapers to obtain Associated
Press services than noncompetitors. In each of these deci-
sions the courts took a regulatory approach: they permitted
continuation of a joint venture which achieved a beneficial
result possible only through joint activity, but required regu-
lation to avoid injury or competitive disadvantage to other
firms in the industry.
OTHER VERTICAL JOINT VENTURES
The status of other vertical joint ventures under the Sher-
man Act is undeveloped and the precedents sparse. Never-
theless, I would suggest that the predictive factors previously
outlined with respect to horizontal joint ventures may be
useful as a framework for analysis. It will be recalled that
these were (1) the presence of inherent or collateral per se
restraints in marketing operation, (2) the market share held
by the parents and the joint venture, and (3) the purpose
of the joint venture.
The most useful precedent is United States v. Paramount
Pictures." There the major producer-distributors of motion
28 See United States v. Terminal R. R. Assn., 224 U.S. 383 (1912)
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1944).
29 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
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picture films, also having a dominant share of first run ex-
hibition, held a substantial number of theatres in joint owner-
ship both among themselves and with nonintegrated exhibi-
tors. Such joint ownership was a relatively small part of a
much larger restraint of trade, replete with per se violations.
Nevertheless, the Court did not simply condemn joint owner-
ship on the ground that it was part of the larger conspiracy,
though that was mentioned.
Instead, the Supreme Court, and the district court as
well, closely analyzed the vertical effects of the joint ventures
between the defendants, and found them objectionable in two
regards: (1) they, eliminated potential competition between
the parents, for in the absence of joint ownership, "the other
joint owner would be in a position to operate indepen-
dently";" and (2) the joint ventures tended to disadvan-
tage independent theatres due to the "natural gravitation of
films . . . to the theatres in whose earnings the distributors
have an interest." 31 Clearly, the joint ventures between de-
fendants were thought to pose important competitive risks,
and dissolution was required. In addition, even joint ven-
tures between a defendant and a nondefendant were dis-
solved if there was any loss of actual or potential competi-
tion.32
A contrary precedent is the 1960 district court Screen
Gems decision." There a joint venture between two motion
picture producers for the joint distribution of their films to
the television market was upheld despite the presence of
price fixing. The joint venture was analyzed as vertical be-
cause one of the parents had no film distribution facility and
indeed, in the court's view, even in the absence of the joint
venture would not itself have entered distribution.
30 344 U.S. at 150. See also 70 F. Supp. 53, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
31 344 U.S. at 151.
32 334 U.S. at 152-153.
33 United States v. Columbia Pictures, 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.
N.Y. 1960).
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The result in Screen Gems is to be explained in part on
the basis of the small share of the market occupied by the
parents, emphasized by the court, and in part on the basis
of defective analysis. In applying the rule of reason the
court failed to see the inevitable price fixing that was in-
volved in a joint selling agency, much less one which included
specific price formulation provisions. Moreover, it was cor-
rect only in the most limited sense to assert, as did the
court, that in the absence of the joint venture the noninte-
grated parent would not have entered into distribution.
While the company might not have undertaken distribution
itself, with a film library of immense television value it would
have found another route to the market; and less restrictive
distribution outlets existed than joint venture with a princi-
pal competitor. Finally, I am not alone in criticizing the
opinion."
Conglomerate Joint Ventures
There appear to be no cases under the Sherman Act where
the relation between the parents and joint venture was purely
Iconglomerate, that is the parents and the joint venture
neither produced the same product nor were in a buyer-seller
relation. Although in a few decisions the relation was con-
glomerate with respect to one of the parents,35 there has not
been any significant identification of anticompetitive effects
with respect to conglomerate joint ventures under the Sher-
man Act. Instead where one of the parents has been in a
conglomerate relationship to the joint venture, analysis has
focused on the relation of the joint venture to the noncon-
glomerate parent. To the extent there is antitrust constraint
on the conglomerate joint venture, it arises under the Clayton
34 See Pitofsky, supra note 3 at 1046-48; but see Bork, The Rule
of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Divi-
sion, 75 YALE L. J. 373, 461-464 (1966).
35 See Panagra, 193 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Cellophane,
118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United
States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940).
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Act (discussed below) and the yet to be developed thrust
of Section 5 of the FTC Act.
JOINT VENTURES UNDER THE CLAYTON ACT
The formation of a joint venture ordinarily involves an
acquisition of stock or assets which brings the transaction
within the jurisdiction of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Since
the standard of illegality under the Clayton Act is broader
than that under the Sherman Act, one might have expected a
significant increase in the antitrust constraints on joint ven-
tures. In fact, there has been no such development in the case
law. The reason is not difficult to detect.
The key to the invigoration of the antimerger law in the
1960's was the development by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Philadelphia National Bank6 and subsequent deci-
sions of simplified, operational rules for merger illegality.
These rules made it possible to resolve the legality of a
merger in a trial of limited length and complexity; and even
more importantly to make some reasonable advance assess-
ment of the antitrust hazard. This development culminated
in the Department of Justice's Merger Guidelines, which
clearly outlined the major areas of antitrust risk.
Section 7 enforcement against joint ventures has lan-
guished by comparison because there has been no similar
development in that field. Instead, the Supreme Court opted
in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co.37 for what
amounted to a rule of reason approach. As already sug-
gested, this is a formula which can lead only to ineffective
enforcement of the antitrust laws. Not surprisingly, there-
fore, I have discovered only a single reported decision on
joint ventures under the Clayton Act in the 12 years follow-
ing Penn-Olin, the Northern Natural8 case (discused below).
36 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
37 United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
38 Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
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Within this framework, and resting on the unavoidably
narrow foundation of only two direct precedents,3 what can
be said about the Clayton Act standards for joint ventures?
To begin with three general observations can be made. First,
any joint venture which inherently violates the Sherman Act,
or in which the collateral violation is so egregious as to re-
quire dissolution of the joint venture, would also be held un-
lawful under the lesser standard of the Clayton Act. But this
is to say very little, for the double violation does not add to
the force of existing law. Second, the Clayton Act could be
used to extend the reach of the Sherman Act by attacking
at a more incipient stage, cartel behavior and vertical fore-
closure arising from joint ventures. In fact, there has been
little development in this direction, despite mention of the
point in Penn-Olin and inclusion as a decisional factor in
Northern Natural.
Third, the focus of analysis has centered instead on po-
tential competition foreclosed by the joint venture, an issue
posed most vividly by the conglomerate joint venture. This
has shifted the spotlight of inquiry away from the competi-
tive implications of the actual joint venture to a considera-
tion of an essentially hypothetical alternative, i.e. whether
in the absence of the joint venture, a more competitive result
might have been obtained. More specifically, Penn-Olin re-
quired courts to ascertain whether the parents were them-
selves potential market entrants, or perceived as such by
firms in the market. The trouble with this development is
that it has introduced an impossible and therefore defeating
complexity.
Preliminary to my discussion of the case law let me at-
tempt, as previously, to set forth a series of predictive fac-
39 The Screen Gems decision, 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960),
also applied Section 7 to a joint venture. But this 1960 district
court decision was issued prior to the line of Supreme Court de-
cisions developing the meaning of the amended Clayton Act and is
not a reliable guide.
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tors, necessarily tentative, for assessing possible Clayton
Act illegality:
1. High concentration in the joint venture market.
2. Possession by the parent companies of a large market
share, in their own market and substantial size in rela-
tion to firms in the joint venture market.
3. Probability that in the absence of the joint venture the
parents would either enter the market in the near
future or exercise a procompetitive influence on the
market as recognized potential entrants.
4. Absence of other, equally potent entrants into the joint
venture market.
5. Possible "spill-over" collusion between the parents.
These factors can be grouped into three basic categories:
(1) the structural characteristics of the market, (2) the prox-
imity between the parents and the joint venture market, and
(3) spill-over collusion between the parents.
Structural Characteristics of Market
The development of Section 7 as applied to joint ventures
has been centered on preserving the forces of new entry and
potential competition affecting the joint venture market. Un-
less that market is concentrated, there is apt to be little need
to preserve such forces, since the presence of numerous com-
petitors within the market will generally provide all the com-
petition desired. In fact, in both Penn-Olin and Northern
Natural the joint venture market was highly concentrated, a
near duopoly in one case and a monopoly in the other.
Even when the joint venture market is highly concen-
trated, the loss of a particular new entrant is apt to make a
difference only if the entrant is likely to be a potent addi-
tion to the market, or alternatively is apt to be so viewed
by firms in the market. Unless the entrant has substantial
size relative to firms in the joint venture market, this ap-
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pears unlikely (although not impossible, since a smaller firm
could possess a unique resource or technological advantage).
In any event substantial parent size was present in each of
the two previous cases.
Proximity Between the Parent
and Joint Venture Markets
The seriousness of any loss of potential competition result-
ing from a joint venture varies according to the proximity
between the parents and the market of the joint venture.
Thus, the most serious loss occurs when the parents are
already in the joint venture market and the least serious
when they are both outside the market and unlikely to enter.
The degree of proximity can be broken down into three rough
categories: (a) both parents already in the joint venture
market, (b) one parent in and the other out, and (c) both
parents outside the joint venture market. Where both par-
ents are already in the market, the joint venture is of course
horizontal. Perhaps because this is the area of greatest
Sherman Act coverage there are no decided cases under the
Clayton Act. The cases have arisen under the two follow-
ing categories.
ONE PARENT IN--ONE PARENT OUT
OF JOINT VENTURE MARKET
Where one parent is in the joint venture market and the
other is out, the relation of the joint venture to the parents
is mixed, partly horizontal and partly either vertical or con-
glomerate. This was the situation in Northern Natural Gas
Co. v. FPC.40 There, a joint venture had been formed be-
tween two large gas transmission companies to build a new
pipeline into the service area of one of the parents-which
then enjoyed a monopoly position. Thus the joint venture
was horizontal as to one parent, and, as it turned out, vertical
as to the other. Not only that, but the vertically related
399 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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parent, Trans-Canada Pipeline, was a recognized and highly
likely potential entrant into the market. The joint venture,
therefore, would have the effect of preventing the entry of
an independent competitor into a monopoly market; and
there were also problems of vertical foreclosure of suppliers
competing with the parents for the patronage of the joint ven-
ture. Not surprisingly, the court of appeals found the joint
venture anticompetitive and remanded the case to the admin-
istrative agency for further consideration.
The merger decision in United States v. El Paso Natural
Gas Co.41 represents a basically similar situation. The single
supplier of out of state natural gas to the California market
acquired another supplier on the eve of its threatened entry
into the market. The Supreme Court held the acquisition in
violation of the Clayton Act. To be sure this was a merger,
but if instead of merging, the two companies had formed a
joint venture to effect entry into the California market, the
case would have been parallel to Northern Natural. That the
result would have been the same is suggested by the Su-
preme Court's explicit reference in Penn-Olin to the rele-
vance of El Paso to joint ventures:
The rule of United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.
• . . where a corporation sought to protect its market
by acquiring a potential competitor, would, of course,
apply to a joint venture where the same intent was
present in the organization of the new corporation.
Thus, the case law development seems sufficient in the one
parent in the market and the other parent out situation to
assert that where (1) the in-the-market parent has a mo-
nopoly or dominant market position, (2) the other parent
is a substantial, clearly recognized potential entrant, and
(3) there are no other, or very few other potential entrants,
41 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
42 378 U.S. at 170. The "intent" in El Paso was simply that
which appeared from the face of the transactions.
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a joint venture between them to enter the market will very
probably be held unlawful under the Clayton Act.
BOTH PARENTS OUT OF JOINT VENTURE MARKET
Where neither of the parents is in the joint venture mar-
ket, the antitrust problem is more difficult. It requires a
balancing of the certain benefits of new entry by joint ven-
ture against the no more than probable benefits of seemingly
more competitive alternatives.1 This was the problem with
which the Court in Penn-Olin wrestled. There the joint ven-
ture would have introduced new competition into a near
duopoly market. On the other hand both parents were rea-
sonably proximate to the market. Indeed, one produced the
very same product in another geographic area, even making
some shipments into the joint venture market, while the other
produced vertically related and complementary products.
Moreover, both parents had previously contemplated indi-
vidual entry.
That a case as factually strong as this should be treated
as doubtful reveals the limited reach of the Clayton Act as
applied to vertical and conglomerate joint ventures. The
Court noted that to establish its case the government must
prove that in the absence of the joint venture either (1) entry
by both parents was probable, or (2) entry by one parent was
probable while the other remained a recognized potential
entrant exerting a procompetitive effect on the market. As
interpreted in Penn-Olin and subsequent merger cases, the
attempt to prove what would have happened on an essen-
tially hypothetical state of the facts, including not merely
the acts, but the perceptions of firms as to market entry
poses an unmanageable issue in a courtroom. But this is
not the end of the difficulty in a joint venture case, for even
when proved, the presence of potential competition then
simply opens the door to a rule of reason inquiry.
43 E.g., entry by each of the parents, or entry by one and the
exertion of an "edge effect" by the other.
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For these reasons I would conclude that when both par-
ents are outside the joint venture market, proof of Clayton
Act illegality on a theory of injury to potential competition is
unlikely and, in any event, usually impossible to predict. It
is scarcely surprising that the law of Section 7 as applied
to joint ventures under this theory is undeveloped.
Possible Spill-Over Collusion Between the Parents
In an often quoted dictum in Minnesota Mining, a Sher-
man Act joint venture case, the court suggested that the
"intimate association" of the parents, in the operation of
the joint venture, might "inevitably reduce their zeal for
competition inter sese." " In addition, the notion that the
continued association of parents in a joint venture increases
risk of collusion appears as a factor in the granting of the
divestiture remedy in cases where the joint venture has been
utilized as a collusive instrument to violate the Sherman Act.45
Risk of collusive spill-over has not, however, in and of itself
become an independent basis for determination of Sherman
Act liability despite Minnesota Mining. The language in
that decision was no more than an aside in a case replete
with more direct antitrust violation by parents which jointly
dominated the United States market. Moreover, in retro-
spect the quoted language of the court, phrased in terms of
competitive risk-except as it may have influenced the
remedy-sounded less in the Sherman Act than in the Clay-
ton Act, which was not involved in the case but which is the
statute directed against incipient antitrust risks.
Turning to the two joint venture decisions under the Clay-
ton Act, Penn-Olin and Northern Natural, we find references
in each to the increased risk of cooperative action between the
parents and indeed between the parents and the joint ven-
ture. In Penn-Olin the reference is minimal; the 'Court
" United States v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp.
947, 963 (D. Mass. 1950).
" See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948);
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 600 (1951).
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merely noted that the formation of a joint venture would
foreclose competition as between the parents and the joint
venture, since it is to be expected that the operations of the
joint venture "will be frozen to those lines of commerce which
will not bring it into competition with the parents," and,
under a similar analysis, the parents themselves "will be
foreclosed from the joint venture's market."," The Court
also spoke of the substitution for "two or more corporations
previously acting independently and usually competitively"
of "'a triumvirate of associated corporations.'" But no
operational principles flow from these generalities.
In Northern Natural, however, the risk of future collusive
action by the parents for the first time appears as a factor
in a joint venture decision under the Clayton Act. As will
be recalled, the joint venture was between the present mo-
nopoly firm in the market and one of a very few potential
entrants. After discussing the anticompetitive effects likely
to result from the joint venture itself, the court turned to
two other "undesirable effects," both involving possible col-
lusion between the parents.
The first such undesirable effect resulted from the agree-
ment between the parents pursuant to which they withdrew
competing applications before the Federal Power Commis-
sion and substituted their joint proposal to serve the market
by joint venture. While the court was critical of the agree-
ment, referring to the danger of allowing potential applicants
to agree on how a market should be divided, the thrust of its
criticism was directed at the Commission, which it suggested
should simply have not permitted withdrawal of the compet-
ing applications.
The court then turned to "a second undesirable aspect of
the joint venture." The very existence of the joint venture,
the court indicated, "increases the risk of joint action between
the parents in future endeavors." 47 Quoting a secondary
378 U.S. at 169.
47 399 F.2d at 972.
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source," the court spoke of the "dangerous proximity" a
joint venture may create between the parents, and then de-
scribed the specific problem in the case:
There is certainly the opportunity for such joint ac-
tion from the parents in the instant case since here the
officers of the joint venture are not only named by the
parent companies but also serve as officers of those com-
panies. There are many forms which this joint action may
take. One form has already made its appearance: the
threatened joint boycott of [two competitors] if their pro-
posals had been certified. A second possibility is re-
ciprocal dealing-that is, American Natural [one par-
ent] may continue to buy from Trans-Canada [the other
parent] only if Trans-Canada promises not to sell to
any competitors of American Natural. . . . Another
possible form of joint conduct is that [the two parents]
could plan cooperative expansion programs which would
divide future markets. Thus it seems that numerous
undesirable joint anticompetitive actions may spring
from this joint venture relationship. 49
The court not only relies on a general propensity for col-
lusive action between the parents, but also refers to three
specific forms of parent collusion, boycotts, reciprocal deal-
ing, and market division. These are more than mere risks
in the air: the boycott has already threatened, and the court
had suggested earlier that the withdrawal by the parents of
competing applications before the FPC was suggestive of
market division.
Northern Natural is a single decision of the court of ap-
peals, and this makes it difficult to assess the extent to which
it may have advanced the law. Perhaps a more useful inquiry
is whether operative principles can be drawn from the deci-
sion. To the following extent I think they can. First, the
" See Brodley, supra note 3, at 333-334.
49 399 F.2d at 972-973.
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stronger and more direct the existing competitive relation-
ship between the parents, the greater the anticompetitive
risk. Second, if there is evidence of parent collusion relating
to the joint venture's line of business, either prior to the
formation of the joint venture or thereafter, the anticom-
petitive risk increases. Third, the specific management and
operating arrangement governing the joint venture can in-
crease or decrease the risk of collaborative action between
the parents. Fourth, the greater the economic incentives for
collusive action, the greater the anticompetitive risk. To-
gether these principles, although leaving much open, may
represent a first tentative step toward a meaningful approach
to the problem of possible spill-over collusion between the
parents.
IMPORTANT ISSUES NOT COVERED IN CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT
In addition to the issues which have been discussed as
operative factors in the decisions, there appear to be other
significant elements, which are rarely if ever mentioned, but
which appear of such obvious relevance that their future
inclusion seems a distinct possibility. The question occurs
whether inclusion of additional factors would work at cross-
purposes to the possibility of clearer and more effective en-
forcement rules for joint ventures. The answer depends on
the simplicity or complexity of the underlying rules. It is
possible to include several factors in a legal rule without
destroying its operational character, as the Merger Guide-
lines demonstrate. The most significant additional issues
appear to be the following:
1. Total Pattern of Joint Venture Activity by Parents
The investigation of a particular joint venture may not
uncover the full network of joint venture interconnection
existing within an industry. Thus, an investigation of a par-
ticular joint venture in iron ore between two steel companies
would not suggest the elaborate network of overlapping
joint ventures that an economic study found actually to ex-
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ist.50 This is relevant to a legal proceeding concerned with
the legality of a particular joint venture since the full anti-
competitive effects can be fully appreciated only in the con-
text of the entire structure of joint venture activities between
the parents, as well as between them and others in the in-
dustry. An illustration of this approach can be found in the
Paramount decision, supra, which was one of the rare cases
to examine the pattern of joint ventures for an entire indus-
try. The need for looking at the whole joint venture network
seems especially strong in a Clayton Act proceeding, where
the range of the statute is broader, but the focus of proof is
otherwise apt to center narrowly on the particular joint ven-
ture acquisition being scrutinized.
.2. The Relation of the Joint Venture to Other Structural
Characteristics of the Parents
The competitive implications of a joint venture should be
viewed also in the context of other structural characteristics
of the parents, such as vertical integration, major contractual
arrangements and exclusive dealing. The existence of the joint
venture changes the incentives and relationships of the firms
involved, but one cannot understand how those incentives and
relationships operate without knowing the full structural pat-
tern of the parents. An example of the interrelation of joint
ventures with other structural characteristics is provided in
Professor Adelman's study of the petroleum industry.5'
3. The Actual Operation and Organization
of the Joint Venture
With public shareholders usually absent, a joint venture
can be organized and run with varying degrees of parental
supervision and coordination. What in fact is the organiza-
tional plan and method of operations can have important
" See D. Fusfield, Joint Ventures in the Iron and Steel Industry,
48 AM. ECON. REV. (Papers & Proceedings) 578 (1958).
51 See ADELMAN, supra note 27, at 82-89.
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competitive implications. At the same time it must be recog-
nized that an organization which appears to minimize com-
petitive risk is subject to change at any time if the parents
agree.
4. The Need for More Information on Joint Ventures
While joint venture acquisitions involving assets or sales
of $10 million or more by companies having combined assets
or sales of $250 million or more must be reported to the
FT C, 52 so far as I know there is no general available inven-
tory of existing joint ventures. SEC reporting requirements
are far from comprehensive. 53 Since joint ventures are typi-
cally small and privately held, the existence as well as the
activities of many may escape notice. In view of their com-
petitive sensitivity, more information would appear highly
desirable. It should at the very least be possible to examine
the full universe of joint ventures in each concentrated in-
dustry.
5. Duration of the Joint Venture
A joint venture may be established for a particular pur-
pose, on balance desirable although carrying competitive risk.
Events may change; the justifying purpose may disappear;
the anticompetitive balance may shift. Joint ventures be-
tween major competitors in particular should be periodically
reviewed to determine whether the original justifying need
continues, and whether other economic and structural de-
velopments have increased the competitive risk. Legitimacy
of a joint venture at its outset should not be deemed a per-
petual charter.
52 1 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 4540.
53 See 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff123,033, 31,103.

